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THE PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: OBSERVATIONS OF A
FOREIGN STUDENTt
by Vasiliy A. Viasihin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fact that the prosecutor has a central role and dominant position
in the American criminal justice system is not a new idea for American
lawyers, law students, or laymen. Almost fifty years ago, the Wicker-
sham Commission noted that the prosecutor's office "is the pivot on
which the administration of criminal justice in the States turns."'
Within his jurisdiction, the prosecutor is usually referred to as the
"chief law enforcement officer." This is the title given to him by both
the American Bar Association' and the National District Attorneys As-
sociation 3 in their standards relating to criminal justice. It is not un-
common for the courts also to use this title for the prosecuting
attorney.
4
The core of the prosecutor's powers is his control over the evidence
presented to him by the police and presented by him to the court. The
prosecutor screens the evidence and decides whether to file charges or
drop them. In doing so, he consults with both the police and the courts
and can exert much influence over both. He, in a word, is the focal
point of the criminal justice system. His formal powers are coupled
t A precis of this article was delivered in Salzburg, Austria at the Salzburg Seminar in
American Studies, Session 192, "American Law and Legal Institutions," July 1979.
* Research Fellow, Institute of United States and Canadian Studies of the U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences; Jurist Degree, Moscow University Juridical Faculty, 1974; Special
Student, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., 1977; Doctor of Juridical Science,
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, 1980.
1. 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION 11 (1931).
2. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3.1 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as ABA PROJECT].
3. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATrORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STAN-
DARDS, Standard 2.1(A) (1977) [hereinafter cited as NDAA STANDARDS].
4. The Supreme Court of Michigan has stated that to ensure orderly warrant procedures,
"all law enforcement" should be funneled "through the prosecuting attorney, the chief law
enforcement officer ofa county." People v. Holbrook, 373 Mich. 94, 97, 128 N.W.2d 484,486
(1964) (emphasis added).
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with a variety of informal ties and influences, which further strengthen
his position in the system.5 The crucial decisions shaping the flow of
the process and its outcome are made either by the prosecutor alone or
with his active participation. That an American prosecutor can use
such power in his discretion and in the absence of outer controls also
seems to be a familiar fact for Americans. As Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis suggests, "the American legal system seems to be shot through
with many excessive and uncontrolled discretionary powers but the one
that stands out above all others is the power to prosecute or not to
prosecute."6
The aim of this article is to analyze the position of the prosecutor in
the criminal process as it appeared to a foreign student of criminal jus-
tice in the United States. There are three basic features that are charac-
teristic of the position of the prosecutor: his broad powers (formal and
informal), his discretion to use them, and the lack of sufficient control
over him. The observations here may not necessarily appear strikingly
new to the American audience, for they are based on the studies of
well-known and oft-quoted American sources. They should be consid-
ered as the observations of a concerned foreign student who, upon en-
tering this particular field of study, discovered certain procedures,
practices, and traditions that seemed to contradict commonly recog-
nized objectives and ideals of criminal justice, as well as principles and
values embodied or implied in the United States Constitution. This
author is one of those European students of criminal procedure, who,
in the words of Dr. Jan Stepan of Harvard Law School, are simply not
able to understand how the broad powers of the American prosecutor
and his "far-reaching prosecutorial discretion can be practiced without
constant violation of both the law and the principle of equal justice.
' 7
II. POWERS OF THE PROSECUTOR
A. The Charging Decision
The power to commence the criminal process by a charging decision
5. Professor Frank Miller, in his comprehensive research on the prosecution function
speaks of "informal arrangements" worked out between the judge and the prosecutor. "It is
only when they cannot reach an informal agreement. . . that the formal law must be con-
sulted to determine whether the judge can enforce his wishes against those of the prosecu-
tor." F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 308
(1970) [hereinafter cited as MILLER].
6. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS].
7. Stepan, Possible Lessonsfrom Continental Criminal Procedure, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 181, 196 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stepan].
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is in reality a monopoly of the public prosecutor in the United States.'
However, the initiation of the criminal process in the United States,
unlike some other countries, does not appear to be a single procedure
carried out and formally recorded by a given official. As Professor
Frank Miller states, the charging decision "is not a unitary decision
made at a readily identifiable time by a specified individual. It is, in-
stead, a process consisting of a series of interrelated decisions. . .. "9
In principle, the basic design of the initial charging stage as provided
by law usually appears as follows. When there is probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime, a law enforcement officer
files a complaint seeking either an arrest or a search warrant.' 0 The
complaint is an official document but is not the formal act by which the
prosecution starts. The complaint is presented, under oath, to a magis-
trate, " who is required by law to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe that the crime was committed and that the suspect
might have committed the crime. The issuance of a warrant by the
magistrate is the procedural act that formally marks the initiation of
prosecution. The warrant itself is the initial, and, in the prosecution of
lesser offenses, the only charging act, and the only document manifest-
ing that formal proceedings have started.'
8. Some states still have procedures by which a private citizen, through his attorney, can
initiate and carry out prosecution. See, e.g., Note, Private Prosecution: A Remedyfor District
Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955). But this procedure, rooted in
ancient common law, is seldom put in motion and does not greatly affect law enforcement.
The necessity of having it on the books is questioned by experts. The ABA has proposed
making the right to initiate the charging process the exclusive prerogative of the public pros-
ecutor. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 2, Standards 2.1, 3.4.
In the federal jurisdiction, the prosecution is literally monopolized by the Attorney Gen-
eral and his subordinate prosecutorial staff. In Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922), the
Court held that the Attorney General, as "the hand of the President" in law enforcement,
has the sole power to enforce the laws through prosecution. Id at 262. In 1933, the Depart-
ment of Justice was administratively authorized to be the only federal agency to prosecute
crimes. Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933). In United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1965), the court noted that "[t]he prosecution of offenses against the United States is an
executive function within the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General." Id at 190
(Wisdom, J., concurring).
9. MILLER, supra note 5, at 11.
10. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath." See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 740
(West 1970), which provides that "all public offenses triable in the inferior courts must be
prosecuted by written complaint under oath."
11. A magistrate is a judicial officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a
person charged with a public offense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 807 (West 1970).
12. It is interesting to note that the prosecutor's decision to charge and prosecute is not
recorded or otherwise documented before a magistrate issues a warrant. The NDAA has
recommended adopting practices whereby "[a] record of the charging decision. . . [is] made
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
B. The Warrant
Presumably, the issuance of a warrant by a "neutral and detached"
magistrate ensures the thorough check of the judiciary over the law
enforcement and prosecutorial agencies' compliance with the constitu-
tional standard of "probable cause" in the initiation of the criminal
process. The legitimacy and validity of their actions at that stage of the
process thus would be assured. It is also assumed that the judicial of-
ficer makes his judgment as to the legitimacy and validity of the institu-
tion of criminal proceedings in a disinterested, neutral, and detached
manner. Neither the police nor the prosecutor can so base their judg-
ments because of their accusatorial purposes.'
3
The courts have made it clear where the power to issue warrants be-
longs. The Supreme Court's decisions during past decades have reaf-
firmed this power as the prerogative of the magistrate. 4 In those states
where statutes empowered prosecutors to issue warrants without judi-
cial control, such practices were held unconstitutional.'"
Despite these legal assumptions and imperatives, the actual initiation
of the criminal process by the issuance of a warrant is different. It is
not the determination of the judicial officer that is of controlling impor-
tance for the police and the prosecutor; rather, the charging decision of
the latter determines the initiation of criminal proceedings. The war-
in each case." NDAA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 132. At the same time, the NDAA has
suggested that "[t]his record should be for office use only, and should not be made available
for outside use." Id at 133. It is not clear whether the latter suggestion implies that an
accused could see the document.
In Soviet criminal procedure, all procedural acts must be recorded. See Code of Criminal
Procedure ofthe RSFSR, Art. 102 at 233 in H. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES (2d ed. H. Berman & J. Spindler trans. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Code]. Decisions to initiate criminal proceedings and charge a suspect with a crime
are recorded in the form ofpostanovlenie (resolution, decree). d. Art. 112 at 236, Art. 144 at
249. The contents of the postanovlenie have to be set forth, and the nature of the charge has
to be explained to a suspect. Id Art. 148 at 250.
13. The Supreme Court has stated that "protection consists in requiring that. . . infer-
ences [from the facts which lead to the complaint] be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). It is assumed that
the initiation of proceedings by the issuance of a warrant by a judicial officer is "better" than
by a law enforcement officer. The neutrality and objectivity of the judicial officer are taken
for granted. However, in practice, this assumption is often not justified. See notes 16-18
infra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
15. See State ex rel Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965) (invalidation of the
statutory provision authorizing issuance of an arrest warrant by either the magistrate or the
prosecutor, confinement of the power to the magistrate alone).
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rant issued by a magistrate is often just a documented and automatic
confirmation of the prosecutor's decision to charge a person with a
crime. It is the undocumented charging decision that is the heart of the
initiation of the criminal process.
The charging decision is made by the prosecutor upon his examina-
tion of available evidence presented to him by police officers seeking a
warrant. The police officers present their complaint or affidavit to the
prosecutor for his informal approval before they formally file a com-
plaint with a magistrate.' 6 The magistrate usually follows the prosecu-
tor's recommendations as to the initiation of criminal proceedings by
issuance of a warrant. There are several practical reasons for this.
First, magistrates do not have investigative facilities and cannot check
whether there is actual "probable cause." Second, many magistrates do
not have adequate training, and they rely upon the judgments of prose-
cutors, the professional lawmen. Third, the magistrate may not be will-
ing to confront the prosecutor at this initial stage, but prefer to put off
potential conflict to further pre-trial stages of prosecution. Detailed
surveys conducted by Professor Miller in Michigan, Kansas, and Wis-
consin showed that the magistrate played virtually no role in the war-
rant decision. 7 It is useless for the police to ignore the District
Attorney's office and file a complaint directly with the magistrate, be-
cause the prosecutor can refuse to prosecute. Thus, a warrant issued in
spite of the prosecutor's wishes can be worthless. 8
16. It is a well established federal rule that, before going to court, federal law enforcement
officers must obtain approval for their complaints from the United States Attorney or the
appropriate division of the Justice Department. In some states, prior approval of the war-
rant by the prosecuting attorney is required by statute. In Michigan, for instance, the magis-
trate cannot issue warrants without the prior written approval of the prosecutor. MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.1195 (1978). The ABA and the NDAA have recommended adoption of
such procedures. ABA PROJECT, supra note 2, Standard 3.4(c), Comment; NDAA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7.3.
17. [T]here is virtually no judicial inquiry into the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of an arrest warrant. And this is true despite the variety of formal schemes for
the allocation of this function. In each of the three states the determination whether a
warrant should be issued is made by the office of the prosecuting attorney.
MILLER, supra note 5, at 54 (emphasis added).
18. The right to enter nolle prosequi or to drop charges by an order of dismissal is one of
the prosecutor's procedural tools. Nolle prosequi ("I am unwilling to prosecute") is deeply
rooted in common law. In the early nineteenth century, the court observed that "[tihe prac-
tice of entering a nolle prosequi to informations is very ancient; but to indictments it began
in the latter end of the reign of Charles 2.. . . Certainly, the court [sic] are not legally
competent to give any advice on this subject." Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 2 Mass. 172, 173
(1806). The right to drop charges, by nolle prosequi or by dismissal, is the absolute preroga-
tive of the prosecutor. There is virtually no recourse to its exercise. In many jurisdictions,
the prosecutor cannot discontinue prosecution without court approval. See, e.g., CAL.
19791
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Usually, initiation of the proceedings coincides with issuance of the
warrant. 9 The standard for the charging decision is "probable cause."
Since the main goal for any ambitious prosecutor is the conviction of a
defendant, this standard becomes the criterion by which the prosecutor
gauges whether he will win the case. Constitutionally, however, the
evidence at the prosecutor's disposal should match the standard of "be-
yond a reasonable doubt," the criterion for conviction. In the prosecu-
tor's mind, this criterion of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is linked not
with the question of a defendant's actual guilt, but only with the ques-
tion of probability of obtaining a conviction.20
It should be noted that winning the case-obtaining the conviction-
in the American adversary system of criminal justice is not necessarily
the result of the search for facts and truth that results from the com-
plete and comprehensive evaluation of all relevant evidence by the
court at trial. The prosecutor's "victory" is very often manifested by a
conviction as the result of a bargained guilty plea, which precludes a
trial.2' Anticipating the plea of guilty, the prosecutor does not bother
with the sufficiency of "probable cause," because the expected plea is
treated in American criminal procedure as the best evidence of guilt
"beyond a reasonable doubt." That is why prosecutors still initiate
criminal proceedings when a suspect "is likely to plead guilty," and
why charges are filed "despite serious doubt in the mind of the prosecu-
tor. . . whether the case would result in a conviction by trial. '22
PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 1979). However, courts rarely deny a request for dismissal. See
MILLER, supra note 5, at 308-17.
19. For further discussion, see MILLER, supra note 5, at 11-15.
20. The following excerpt from an interview with a Los Angeles prosecutor illustrates the
point:
In an area like Los Angeles, we have a tremendous number of cases going through the
system and we can't afford to pump "bad" cases into the system. We have to think that
we've got a reasonable probability of winning the case. Even if the guy, we think, is
guilty as hell, we've got to think we've got a reasonable probability of winning the case;
otherwise, we do not file the case. . . .We have to think that we can win the case at
trial.
Interview with Mr. Robert Altman, Central Complaints Division, Los Angeles County Dis-
trict Attorney's Office, in Los Angeles (Aug. 30, 1977).
21. In Soviet criminal procedure, the court and the prosecutor are obliged "to take all
measures provided by law for a thorough, complete, and objective analysis of the circum-
stances of the case." Code, supra note 12, Art. 20 at 210.
22. MILLER, supra note 5, at 42-43.
Harvard law professor Lloyd Weinreb suggests that with "formalities aside. . . the actual
course of a prosecution is shaped from the beginning to make a guilty plea the natural
outcome." L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED
STATES 73 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WEINREB].
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C. The Evidence
Aiming the case at a win by conviction, the prosecutor exerts corre-
sponding influence upon police and magistrates in accordance with this
aim. The prosecutor screens the evidence presented by the police and
scrutinizes the legitimacy of the ways in which it was obtained. Thus,
he examines its relevance and admissibility for potential presentation at
trial. The prosecutor is free to reject evidence seized by obviously un-
lawful means as well as evidence the admissibility of which he might
doubt. In checking the admissibility of evidence, the prosecutor in fact
reviews the legality of the police investigation. In doing so, he .indi-
rectly controls the police. He does not do this, however, in discharge of
a duty of supervising the legality of the work of the police.23
In rejecting evidence obtained in legally dubious ways, the prosecu-
tor guides himself by purely utilitarian considerations. He is aware
that the record of conviction is the criterion for procedural efficiency
and political popularity of an elected prosecutor. He therefore needs
evidence for "no loss" prosecutions. When, in a given case, he cannot
count on a guilty plea and expects trial, he knows that available evi-
dence may be excluded by the court.24 For this reason, he might, at the
23. John Van de Kamp, District Attorney of Los Angeles, in explaining the relationship
between his office and the police, has stated:
We are not here to watch them-in a ride-along capacity-every day of their opera-
tions. We operate as an indirect check when the police go off the deep end; the police-
man goes beyond the scope of his authority, commits a criminal act-then we prosecute
him .... We are a sort of watchdog of police in that respect, but I can't tell you that we
control how the police set their policies. That is a separate, almost political, structure
and they operate under different kinds of leadership.
Interview with John K. Van de Kamp, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (Aug.
3, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Van de Kamp Interview].
In the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, the prosecutorial agencies (the procuracy) are constitu-
tionally vested with the power to supervise closely the work of the investigative agencies.
The Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a] procurator shall exercise supervi-
sion over the execution of the laws in the conduct of an inquiry or a preliminary investiga-
tion." Code, supra note 12, Art. 211 at 269. The Procurator General of the U.S.S.R. and
procurators subordinate to him, are obliged to "watch over the undeviating observance by
agencies of inquiry and preliminary investigation of the procedure established by law for
investigation of crimes." Statute on the Procuracy Supervision in the U.S.S.R., Art. 17(3), in
BASIC LAWS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE 182, 187 (H. Berman & J. Quigley
trans. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Statute].
24. In the procedural framework of the American legal system, ombudsman-type
prosecutorial supervision over police investigation is unknown. In view of this lack of ad-
ministrative control over the police, the exclusion of evidence obtained by the police in an
unlawful manner is the only effective way to compel respect for constitutional guarantees.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
By applying this "exclusionary rule" to police evidence, prosecutors can effectively shape
police practices in accordance with their own policies. But, this may also work to upgrade
and polish police skills.
1979]
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start, reject certain evidence, even at the expense of not prosecuting a
person whose guilt is obvious.
One should not think that all prosecutors at all times screen evidence
to select only "sterile" evidence, thereby committing themselves to ex-
posing or preventing unlawful police practices. First, prosecutorial
overzeal in this respect can lead to confrontations with the police. That
may be risky, for many prosecutors do not have adequate investigative
staff and must rely on police detectives. Second, in many cases the ne-
cessity to scrutinize evidence as to its admissibility does not arise be-
cause of the prosecutor's firm determination to win the case by any
means. Aiming the prosecution at the desired conviction, prosecutors
may initiate proceedings lacking actual "probable cause." Sometimes
this is done for political purposes or under political pressures, direct or
indirect. 26 Striving to win the case by conviction may turn the prosecu-
tor's energy from the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence to the
opposite, inclusion of evidence of any legal "quality.
27
We have filing standards. . . .The police have to come to us with their evidence, and
we have to make an evaluation under our standards as to whether or not there is suffi-
cient evidence to file a case. And for this reason there is always a substantial amount of
conflict between our office and the police department. But it is true that with our filing
standards, we were able to push the police department toward a greater degree of pro-
fessionalism. Police departments here when I came in, and particularly the Los Angeles
police department, did a very sloppy job in terms of investigating cases. They had had
a pretty free time in the past in getting cases filed. We've compelled them now to do
almost all of the work that's necessary before they come to us to file the case. . . .In a
sense, by our standards and our refusal to file cases until they've done certain things, we
do have a fairly significant impact on them.
Van de Kamp Interview, supra note 23.
25. One major difference between the duties of the American prosecutor and those of his
European counterpart is that the former is free "not to prosecute in cases where guilt may
reasonably be expected to be proved before the court." Stepan, supra note 7, at 195.
26. The prosecution of Angela Davis, Marxist scholar and member of the Communist
Party of the U.S.A., provides an example. She was indicted as a co-conspirator for kidnap-
ping and murder. See, e.g., Skolnick & Brick, A Fair Trialfor Angela Davis? NATION, July
19, 1971, at 46-50. Assistant Attorney General of California, A. Harris, Jr., was the prosecu-
tor in the case. He contended that "It]he evidence clearly provides probable cause to believe
that Davis conspired with Jonathan Jackson to kidnap Judge Haley." Uproar Over the An-
gela Davis Case-the Facts, the Issues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 11, 1971, at 39.
But, despite the huge bulk of evidence and the statements of prosecution witnesses, Angela
Davis was acquitted. "The prosecution's case was based on purely circumstantial evidence."
Angela's Triumphant Acquittal, TIME, June 12, 1972, at 22.
27. In the case of the Wilmington Ten, civil rights activists, it was revealed that the prose-
cution had bribed or coerced some witnesses into testifying on its behalf. See Who Bombed
Mike's Grocery?. TIME, May 23, 1977, at 83.
There is an affirmative duty of the prosecutor to inform the court that his witness has
committed perjury, United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974), and to withhold
evidence known to be false, United States v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1976). How-
ever, in striving to "get" a person whose conviction is deemed desirable for political or other
7DMERICAN PROSECUTORMAL DISCRETION
Finally, the prosecutor does not bother to collect evidence sufficient
for conviction at trial when he believes he will obtain the conviction as
the result of a guilty plea. In such a case, the prosecutor confines his
efforts or those of the police to gathering minimal evidence. He sees his
task merely as the "procedural blufl'--the tactical art of convincing the
defendant that the prosecution rests on solid evidence sufficient to con-
vict at trial.
. The Preliminary Hearing
After the charging decision is made by the prosecutor and formally
confirmed by the magistrate's warrant, the next important stage in the
process is the decision to hold a suspect for trial. The legal assumption
is that such a decision is the prerogative of the grand jury in serious
cases, or of the magistrate in the majority of cases.
The magistrate's decision is made at the preliminary hearing. 28 The-
oretically, the function of the preliminary hearing is to screen cases:
29
to determine whether a crime has been committed, whether there is
"probable cause" to believe that the defendant is guilty of that crime,3"
and whether the defendant should be bound over for the formal charge
by the prosecutor ("the information"). The statutes provide that the
preliminary hearing should be held in the presence of the prosecutor,
the defendant, and the defense attorney. The magistrate is to hear both
prosecution and defense witnesses, and cross-examination is allowed.31
It is assumed that by vesting in the magistrate control over the pre-
liminary hearing, the judiciary provides a balance for government
prosecutors in order "to prevent hasty, malicious, improvident, and op-
pressive prosecutions. 32 In fact, the preliminary hearing is the proce-
dure in which the prosecutor, having made the initial charging
decision, freely reigns. In many cases, the "probable cause" examina-
tion by the magistrate turns out to be a formality easily surmounted by
reasons, a prosecutor may act contrary to this duty. Naturally, no prosecutor would admit to
that.
28. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 1970). See also Graham & Letwin, A Study
of the Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 636 (1971).
29. The function of the preliminary hearing is "to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to proceed to trial." ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
330.1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE].
30. In 1975, the Supreme Court ruled that a hearing on probable cause is required by the
Constitution. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
31. For the law and current administration of the preliminary hearing, see MILLER, supra
note 5, at 64-82.
32. Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922), quotedin State v. Florence,
306 Minn. 442, 447 n.4, 239 N.W.2d 892, 896-97 n.4 (1976).
1979]
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the prosecutor. Thus, the preliminary hearing merely provides a rub-
ber stamp approval for the prosecutor's decision to proceed.
At this stage, the magistrate evaluates only the "probability" or "suf-
ficiency" of the defendant's guilt in order to bind him over for further
proceedings. Therefore, there is no need for discovery, and the magis-
trate does not examine all of the evidence obtained by the prosecution.
The defendant has no right to see all of the prosecutor's evidence. 33 At
the typical preliminary hearing, one or two prosecution witnesses tes-
tify, there is little cross-examination and no disclosure to the defend-
ant.
34
The practice of minimum disclosure by the prosecutor is the reason
why his energies are channeled into making that small amount of evi-
dence for presentation in the preliminary hearing appear immaculate.
At this stage, the prosecutor's main task is to demonstrate his confi-
dence in conviction. If he expects a guilty plea, he confines himself to
the task of convincing the magistrate of the sufficiency of the evidence
in order to portray the magistrate's decision to the defendant as the
combined punitive resoluteness of the state. In this manner, the way is
paved for plea bargaining. The preliminary hearing thus seems to be
an evaluation of the prosecutor's tactical arts rather than the justness of
holding the defendant for trial. Such practices resemble, in the words
of the Soviet scholar Dr. Konstantin Gutsenko, "not one of the stages
in the legal process to ascertain the truth but more likely [a] dishonest
33. In the American criminal system, pre-trial discovery by the defendant and his counsel
is within the prosecutor's discretion. The prosecutor may offer the defendant an opportunity
to examine the evidence, but he is under no duty to do so. As one court has suggested, "[t]he
mission of the [preliminary] hearing is an investigation into probable cause for further pro-
ceedings against the accused. It does not include discovery. . . . [S]ome discovery becomes
a by-product of the process of demonstrating probable cause. But in no sense is discovery a
legitimate end unto itself." Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1199-1200 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
However, "discovery is designed to ascertain the truth. . . in criminal as well as civil cases
.... [Tihe state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw
light on issues in the case." Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 58-59, 372 P.2d 919, 920,
22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 880 (en banc) (citations omitted).
Although there is a trend in American law to liberalize the concept of discovery, the suspi-
cion remains that the question of letting the defendant examine evidence against him is in
the hands of the prosecution. One reason for this is that pre-trial discovery is not protected
by due process constitutional requirements. In Soviet criminal procedure, full pre-trial dis-
covery for the defendant is required by law. It is a duty of the prosecution to "present all of
the materials of the case to the accused and his defense counsel" upon the completion of the
preliminary investigation and before the indictment is filed. Code, supra note 12, Art. 201 at
266.
34. MILLER, supra note 5, at 65.
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card game."35
The magistrate, here as in the warrant issuance procedure, relies
upon the prosecutor's ability to screen cases. He assumes that as soon
as the prosecutor decides to prosecute, he will do his best to push the
case through the process. The magistrate is, of course, free to dismiss
charges for want of "probable cause," but this is rarely done.
3 6
The law equips prosecutors with procedural tools to overcome a
magistrate's decision to dismiss charges. Prosecution of the defendant
may be re-initiated for the same offense, or for a different one on lesser
charges.37 Prosecutors can also "shop around" for a magistrate more
sympathetic to their endeavors. As the Kansas Supreme Court sug-
gested:
[D]ischarge by a magistrate is not a bar to another preliminary examina-
tion. The state has supplied itself with many magistrates .... Out of all
of these we rather imagine it would not be too difficult to find some mag-
istrate who would lend a responsive ear in any case where the state seeks
to bind over a person ... .38
The magistrate's decision to discharge the defendant is not, in law or in
practice, an absolute obstacle for the prosecutor. In effect, the magis-
trate is under the indirect control of any prosecutor who is determined
to seek conviction.
E. The Grand Jury
The prosecutor exercises actual control over holding for trial even
when this function has theoretically been assigned to the grand jury.
39
The grand jury is one of the oldest American legal institutions. It is
rooted in ancient English history, was transplanted to American soil by
the Colonists, and affirmed by the Bill of Rights.40 Basically, the grand
jury performs two functions: it investigates and it brings formal
35. K. GUTSENKO, UGOLOVNY PROTSESS OSNOVNYKH KAPITALISTITCHESKYKH
GOSUDARSTV (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE LEADING CAPITALIST STATES) 139 (1969).
36. By Professor Frank Miller's estimates, the average dismissal rate of all defendants
entitled to a preliminary hearing is 2%. MILLER, supra note 5, at 84.
37. "There is no constitutional or statutory inhibition against holding more than one pre-
liminary examination for the same offense. ... Kansas v. Curtis, 108 Kan. 537, 539, 196
P. 445, 445 (1921).
38. Kansas v. McCombs, 164 Kan. 334, 337, 188 P.2d 922, 924 (1948).
39. The use of the term "holding for trial" is not technically correct with respect to the
grand jury. In theory, the function of the grand jury is to initiate criminal prosecution. In
practice, the prosecutor makes the initial decision to prosecute. The grand jury is assembled
in response to this decision.
40. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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charges in serious cases.4 1 As a constitutional institution, the grand
jury in the early history of the United States was contemplated "as a
protective bulwark standing between the ordinary citizen and an over-
zealous prosecutor. '4 2 The legal assumption behind the short formula
in the Bill of Rights is that a panel of peers should serve as a citizen's
protection against the abuse of prosecutorial power by the government.
It was to be the citizens' check on prosecutors and the citizens' body
controlling the charging process in serious cases.43
Modem practices clearly demonstrate that the grand jury has be-
come the opposite of contemplated ideals and legal assumptions. From
the protector of the rights of an accused and the guarantor of legality in
prosecutions, it has been transformed into an obedient tool of prosecu-
tors and, in too many instances, their instrument in oppressive persecu-
tions.
Abuses of the grand jury's powers in the interests of prosecutors be-
came possible by virtue of procedures employed for grand juries' func-
tioning. Conceived as the arm of the court, the grand jury in many
states is selected by court officials" and instructed by a judge before its
session starts. Once assembled, however, jurors are captured by the
prosecutor. The hearing is closed and secret, proceedings are not steno-
graphically recorded, the judge is not present, and witnesses' counsel
are not allowed into the chamber. All of these factors work to the ben-
efit of the prosecutor: he is the only official at the hearings, he is the
only lawyer upon whose advice jurors can rely,45 and he is free to pre-
sent them with information of his own choosing since he can be confi-
dent in the secrecy of the proceedings. Under such conditions, the
prosecutor naturally controls the outcome of the proceedings. Re-
41. See, e.g., Dummit, Investigatory Powers of Caifornia Grand Juries, 46 CAL. ST. B.J.
467 (1971); Mar, The California Grand Jury System.- A Vestige ofAristocracy, I PAC. L.J. 36
(1970); Note, Some Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 8 STAN. L. REV. 631 (1956).
42. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
43. The Supreme Court has eulogized the grand jury as an institution:
Historically, [the srand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in
our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an
individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon
reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice or personal ill will.
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
44. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 903.4 (West 1970).
45. "It is the prosecutor who will explain and construe the myriad of laws that the Grand
Jury is charged to enforce. Moreover, this representative of the executive branch of the
government will also-instruct the jury as to the quantum of proof necessary to justify an
indictment .... " Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
174, 177 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Campbell].
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turning a grand jury indictment is his enterprise, both practically and
technically. The document itself is, in effect, drafted by his office, and
the "true bill" resolution of the jurors has to be confirmed by the prose-
cutor. 6 The grand jury is powerless to override the prosecutor's disap-
proval.47 At the same time, the refusal of the jurors to return the
indictment is not an obstacle for the prosecutor; he can refer the case to
a new panel, or charge the same person by filing an "information."48
The grand jury has been under heavy criticism in recent years, both
as an institution and for its practices.49 The operations of federal grand
juries during the Nixon administration were attacked for political
abuses. Attorney General Mitchell's prosecutors used grand juries to
stifle political protest and to prosecute black, youth, and antiwar activ-
ists. Many of these activists "have spent time in jail as a direct result of
the expanded grand jury powers. . . . Government prosecutors, led by
Guy Goodwin of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division,
turned federal grand juries into rubber stamps in this new method of
radical witch-hunting."5 Grand jury hearings arranged by federal
prosecutors were aimed at discrediting and harrassing political oppo-
nents as well as pumping out information for intelligence purposes of
federal law enforcement.5'
There is a move now to reform or abolish grand juries.52 Several
bills have been introduced in Congress to reform grand jury proce-
dures. Reformist aspirations have probably been dictated not by con-
cern over the political roles of grand juries in government attacks on
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(l).
47. The provision of Rule 7, requiring the signing of the indictment by the attorney for
the government, is a recognition of the power of government counsel to permit or not to
permit the bringing of an indictment. If the attorney refuses to sign.. .. we conclude
that there is no valid indictment.
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
48. The National District Attorneys Association defends the right of the prosecutor to
choose freely the manner of prosecution. "The prosecutor should have the option to bypass
the Grand Jury as long as there is provision for probable cause determination." NDAA
STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 14.2(A) at 183.
49. For a strong criticism of institutional deficiencies, see Campbell, supra note 45, at 174-
82.
50. Gerth, The Americanization of 1984, SUNDANCE MAGAZINE, April/May 1972, at 58,
65, reprintedin CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 213, 244 (R. Quinney ed. 1974). In view of
the roles of grand juries in "law 'n' order" policies of the Nixon administration, Judge
Campbell's remark that "[the grand jury] has outlived its reputation as the bulwark of de-
mocracy" is noteworthy. Campbell, supra note 45, at 179.
51. For detailed descriptions, see L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY (1975).
52. In many states, grand juries are practically inactive. In Los Angeles County in 1976,
only 40 out of 21,000 criminal cases went to a grand jury. Footlick, Reforming the Grand
Jury, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1977, at 46.
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radical movements, but rather by the fact that in certain investigations
federal grand juries stepped on the toes of economically and politically
privileged groups. General Motors lawyers complained that in investi-
gations by the Internal Revenue Service, the grand jury was used as
"the sword" of the IRS. 3 Corruption and other white collar crimes
have also been targets of grand juries. Nevertheless, the prosecutorial
brethren, by and large, oppose reforming the grand jury, trying instead
to preserve it as the duteous and pliable instrument of prosecution.
F Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is the next, and, for the most part, inevitable stage
after formal charges by indictment or information have been brought
against the defendant and filed with the court. At arraignment, the de-
fendant is called before the court and officially informed of the charges
to which he is required to plead. He has the right to plead guilty, nolo
contendere, or not guilty. As many as approximately ninety percent of
all defendants in the United States enter guilty pleas. Most of these
pleas result from negotiations or bargaining between the prosecutor
and defense counsel or the defendant. 4
In the words of the 1967 President's Commission, "few practices in
the system of criminal justice create a greater sense of unease and sus-
picion than the negotiated plea of guilty. '55 European observers of
American criminal justice would readily agree to this. As Dr. Jan Ste-
pan suggests, "[i]t is hardly possible to imagine any system of criminal
justice where plea bargaining, at least as it is presently known in this
country, would not function as a malignant disease, metastatically at-
tacking the whole organism of administration of justice.
56
There is probably no need for a detailed discussion of the nature of a
guilty plea resulting from plea bargaining. 7 In short, it is a procedure
by which a defendant, after securing the prosecutor's promise of leni-
53. Id
54. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, at 9 [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE RE-
PORT]. See, e.g., Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964) ("most" guilty
pleas result from bargains made with prosecutors); People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 608, 477
P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 393 (1970) (en banc) (probably the "'vast majority'" of
criminal cases are disposed of through plea bargaining) (quoting In re Tahl, I Cal. 3d 122,
138, 460 P.2d 449, 461, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 589 (1969) (Peters, J., dissenting)).
55. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 9.
56. Stepan, supra note 7, at 196.
57. For a description of the plea bargaining mechanism in a broad variety of cases, see
Note, The Legitimation f Plea Bargaining: Remedies/or Broken Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 771 (1973).
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ency, pleads guilty to a lesser charge, thus removing the case from the
criminal process. 8 The confession of guilt is considered to be the best
evidence of guilt in American criminal procedure, for it is "as conclu-
sive as a verdict of a jury."' 9
Cases on the subject are legion.6 0 The amount of literature is huge,
and so are the authors' criticisms.6 It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss all aspects of plea bargaining, but one point should be made
in view of the approach undertaken-namely, the significance of plea
bargaining and its potential use by the prosecutor in the criminal pro-
cess. It is a legal assumption that criminal justice should be adminis-
tered by the court. In this process, the court is supposed to resolve two
central and vital questions: the question of guilt or innocence, and the
question of the appropriate sanction for a person found guilty. Estab-
lishing facts and determining guilt are functions assigned to the jury.
Imposition of criminal sanctions provided by law is often the preroga-
58. The operation of the guilty plea is rooted in the common law model of criminal proc-
ess and has developed historically as a "combat," or "adversary" process. Entering a guilty
plea meant that the defendant submitted to the claims of the state as to his guilt. He thus
waived all his defenses, Kachnic v. United States, 53 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1931), and
broke "the chain of events which had preceded [the guilty plea] in the criminal process."
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). As a venerable authority wrote: "If the
Prisoner say Guilty, then the Confession is recorded, and no more is done to him till Judg-
ment." M. DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 515 (London 1705) (1st ed. London 1618),
quoted in Cogan, Guilty Pleas.- Weak Links in the "Broken Chain," 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 149,
154 (1974).
In his excellent analysis of the deficiencies in the American criminal process, Professor
Lloyd Weinreb suggests:
On any fair account of our actual practices, conviction by guilty plea is normal and a
trial the exception. This reversal of the theoretical and actual models of our criminal
process is the more striking because we are so fond of proclaiming it a mark of our
civilization that the government is required to prove a person's guilt without assistance
from him .... In fact, we rely on the dejendant'sformal admission ofguiltfar more than
other countries, whose procedures we criticize because they are not based so fully on our
conception of an adversary system.
WEINREB, supra note 22, at 71-72 (emphasis added).
59. BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 954 (3d ed. 1969). Other countries' criminal justice
systems do not rely so heavily upon defendants' confessions as the only evidence needed to
convict a defendant. Individual circumstances can draw a person into self-incrimination. It
is therefore a firm rule in Soviet criminal procedure that "an acknowledgement of guilt by
the accused may become the basis for an accusation only if the acknowledgement is con-
firmed by the totality of evidence in the case." Code, supra note 12, Art. 77 at 227.
60. See, e.g., note 54 supra.
61. See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION (1966); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining. Compromises
by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964). For an analysis of the
destructive impact of plea bargaining on constitutionally protected values, see Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Plea Bargaining].
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tive of the judge. Guilt is determined on the basis of facts proved at a
public trial by jury, as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.62 A guilty plea
means the waiver of this right. For the prosecutor, this waiver is of
great importance, for (1) it helps to save time and resources in the face
of an overwhelming caseload; (2) it provides for certain conviction,
which may not necessarily have followed from a trial; (3) it removes
possibilities of judicial scrutiny of the admissibility of evidence, and of
potential use of the "exclusionary rule," thus drawing a cloak of se-
crecy around the preceding actions of the police and the prosecutor; (4)
it contributes to the number of convictions in the prosecutor's record;
(5) it adds to the impression of prosecutorial effectiveness; 63 and (6) it
helps save resources for thorough preparation of those cases designed
to go to trial.
Thus, the prosecutor is essentially interested in a continual flow of
guilty pleas. Other participants in the criminal process also have a
practical interest in these pleas.64 Motivated by his own incentives and
backed by the interests of other participants, the prosecutor induces
guilty pleas by offering bargains. It is the prosecutor who is the back-
bone of plea bargaining, and his efforts to induce guilty pleas play a
central role in the administration of justice.65 The terms of plea
charges and sanctions are worked out within the walls of his office and
then offered to a defendant. Recommendations of the prosecutor as to
the sentence are routinely followed by the judge in his sentencing deci-
66sion.
The prosecutor, while arranging a guilty plea, in effect usurps the
roles of the court: it is he who replaces the jury in its function of deter-
mining guilt, for he decides to what offense the defendant may plead
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." The right ofjury trial
is protected under the due process clause and is applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
63. Points (4) and (5) are especially important to an elected D.A. because, in order to
secure re-election, he can demonstrate to the community his prosecutorial activism and ef-
fectiveness. Describing the once famous Manhattan D.A.'s office headed by Frank Hogan,
Mayer wrote: "Defendants plead guilty in New York County because lawyers can demon-
strate to them that they have no earthly hope of winning in court." Mayer, "Hogan's Office."
A Kind ofMinistry of Justice, in CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 138, 139 (D. Cressey ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Mayer].
64. See, e.g., W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER 395-414 (1957).
65. White, A Proposalfor Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439,
439 (1971).
66. The California statute requires that the sentence conform to the terms worked out in
plea discussions; the plea is withdrawn if it is otherwise. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.2
(West 1979).
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guilty; it is he to whom the judge's function of sentencing is delegated,
for he decides the terms of the sentence and submits them to the judge
for an automatic approval. When coupled with the fact that ninety per-
cent of all criminal cases in the United States are disposed of by guilty
pleas, one cannot help viewing American criminal justice as a system
administered by an organ of the executive branch rather than "by pub-
lic jury trial." Actual operation of the criminal justice system thus ap-
pears to be ninety percent contrary to its theoretical model.
Administrative justice by the prosecutor seems to be a more accurate
definition for the operations of the criminal justice system in the United
States.67
Several decades ago, Professor Raymond Moley defined. the powers
and roles of the prosecutor:
I have attempted to indicate the very great importance of the public pros-
ecutor, a fact which is particularly American. The sheriff and the coroner,
the grand jury, and finally the petit jury, products of a long historical
evolution, have quite faded into insignificance. Likewise, both the exam-
ining magistrate and the trial judge in state courts. . . perform no domi-
nant role. In the midst of the decay and impotence of his official
associates, the prosecutor rises to a definite mastery. To a considerable
extent he is police, prosecutor, magistrate, grand jury, petit jury, and
judge in one.68
Moley's contention that the prosecutor has, "to a considerable extent,"
the concentrated functions of police, magistrate, grand jury, trial jury,
and judge does not appear too exaggerated when applied to certain
procedures in the criminal process. It also applies to many aspects of
the prosecutor's relationships with other participants in the process.
67. In theory the function of the District Attorney is to prosecute in the courts people
charged with committing felonies and misdemeanors. In fact, so far as serious crimes
are concerned, Hogan's office determines whether accused people are guilty or not.
Once the New York D.A. decides you are guilty of a felony, you are .... [I]n New
York County-and to only somewhat lesser degree in other jurisdictions-what we re-
ally have is an administrative system of criminal justice, where the evidence is weighed
and the important decisions are taken in the prosecutor's office.
Mayer, supra note 63, at 139-40.
68. R. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION vii (1929). The control of the
"chief federal prosecutor" over the legal process within the federal courts is most apparent
and striking. The functions of the Department of Justice place it in a position to control
administratively investigation (FBI, INS, DEA), prosecution (divisions of the Department,
U.S. Attorneys in federal districts), selection of judges (recommendations to the President),
appeals (Solicitor General), execution and enforcement of courts' decisions (U.S. Marshals),
the serving of sentences by federal convicts (Bureau of Prisons), parole (U.S. Parole Com-
mission, formerly U.S. Board of Parole), and commutation of sentence and pardon (Pardon
Attorney). For a discussion of the roles of the Justice Department, see Removing Politics
from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation ofPowers of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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His decisions do substitute for those of other officials, and he is in de
facto control of crucial stages of criminal prosecution.
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The indispensable characteristic of the status of an American prose-
cutor is his wide, unlimited discretion in exercising the powers con-
ferred on himn. 6 9 Absolute prosecutorial discretion is a fundamental
component of the American criminal justice system. Probably nowhere
else in the world does the situation exist in which a government official,
responsible for prosecution, is accountable to no one in the discharge of
his function.
It is likely that the free exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a corol-
lary to the fact that, in the American legal system, prosecution is a right
which the prosecutor is free to invoke, but not a duty.70 The very term
"attorney" implies that a person was "attorned" to perform certain
functions in the name of another. The prosecutor is the attorney of his
client, the sovereign. He is legally empowered to act as an agent in
those areas of the sovereign's functioning that deal with prosecution.
7 '
Prosecution as the sovereign's function has, in a sense, been "attorned,"
turned over wholly to the prosecuting attorney. The point is that the
prosecutor has become, in effect, a free agent, handling his function as
he deems it best in the interests of his client.72 Thus, in American
69. See generally DAVIS, supra note 6, at 188-214; MILLER, supra note 5, at 151-345;
Abrams, Internal Policy. Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1 (1971); Breitel, Controls in CriminalLaw Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Breitel]; Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Offi-
cials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651 [hereinafter cited as Vorenberg]; Note, The Special Prosecutor if
the Federal System: A Proposal, I 1 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 577 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
SpecialProsecutor]; Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1957) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Discretion].
70. For a general discussion of the distinction between "duty" and "right" in the exercise
of the prosecution function, see Special Prosecutor, supra note 69, at 588.
71. Sequitur pro rege was the command for attornatus regis to appear for the Crown in
court proceedings in the thirteenth century. See Bellot, The Origin of the Attorney-General,
25 L. Q. REV. 400, 406-07 (1909). For the development of the Crown's legal officers in the
medieval era, see J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN (1964).
72. 'Yust because a crime has been committed, it does not follow that there must necessarily
be aprosecution, for it lies with the District Attorney to determine whether acts. . . should
as a matter of public policy not be prosecuted." Hassan v. Magistrates' Court, 20 Misc. 2d
509, 514, 191 N.Y.S.2d 238, 243 (1959) (emphasis in original). On the other hand, Soviet
criminal procedure provides that a prosecutor is "obliged. . .to initiate a criminal case in
every instance in which indicia of a crime are disclosed and to take all measures provided by
law for ascertaining the occurrence of the crime and the persons guilty of committing it."
Code, supra note 12, Art. 3 at 206.
The prosecutor in the Soviet criminal justice system is not left without any discretion, for
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criminal justice, prosecuting the accused appears to be the right rather
than the duty of the public prosecutor.
One may ask for the definition of "discretion," and what it relates to,
in this observation of the prosecutor's roles. It has been said to be an
official's functioning in a situation in which he "is authorized and
rather encouraged by statute to exercise his best judgment with great
freedom and little guidance."73
Usually, prosecutorial discretion is viewed only with respect to the
initiation or commencement of a criminal prosecution. It should be
noted, however, that practically all procedural acts after the complaint
is filed and up to the trial refract and often substantially deflect in the
prisms of the prosecutor's discretion. Within his discretion, the vital
issues of a criminal prosecution are resolved: initiating proceedings,
discharging, nature and number of charges, and plea bargaining. Be-
ing in control of the criminal process during the many stages of prose-
cution,74 the prosecutor is free to and inevitably does make decisions of
a discretionary nature.
A. To Initiate or To Refuse To Prosecute
The refusal of the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings, even
upon obvious "probable cause," is never documented. Reasons for it
are rarely given to interested parties, and it cannot be appealed.75 At-
tempts to secure court backing in appeals from negative charging deci-
it is unrealistic and unworkable to have no discretion at all. He may, for example, drop
charges against a person who "has ceased to be socially dangerous." Id Art. 6 at 207. Addi-
tionally, other alternatives to prosecution are available, viz., transfer to Comrade's Court or
to the Commission for Cases of Minors, release on surety to a collection of working people,
and application of social pressures. Id Arts. 7-10 at 207-09.
While one commentator notes the similarity of these provisions to prosecutorial discre-
tion, this element of Soviet discretion is built into the law. "Thus a reasonable system of
criminal law can be enforced without becoming intolerable, not because the prosecutor can
drop the prosecution, but because he is obliged to drop it wherever the case fails to show the
necessary degree of social danger." Stepan, supra note 7, at 196-97.
73. Vorenberg, supra note 69, at 654.
74. The rationale in United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. I11. 1945), suggests
that the prosecutor is in full control of the prosecution just because he is in control of the
initial charging decision. "The control of criminal litigation during many stages of a prose-
cution is a prerogative and power closely akin to the power of initiating a prosecution." Id
at 101.
75. Professor Davis asks a simple question:
Why should a prosecutor. . . have discretionary power to decide not to prosecute even
when the evidence of guilt is clear, . . . without ever having to state to anyone what
evidence was brought to light by his investigation and without having to explain to
anyone why he interprets a statute as he does or why he chooses a particular position on
a difficult question of policy?
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sions by prosecutors usually fail, for the courts adhere firmly to the
posture of non-interference with the free exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion.76
This uncontrolled power to refuse to prosecute is combined with the
discretionary power to commence further prosecution and to control it
after the proceedings have been initiated. Prior to trial, the power to
withdraw prosecution is absolute. After the trial begins, however, it is
subject to judicial control, but courts rarely countermand a prosecutor's
decision to dismiss charges.78 The line of cases since the beginning of
the last century suggests that courts have interpreted the prosecutor's
power to discontinue prosecution as a discretionary one that is superior
to that of the court.7 9
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 189.
In Soviet criminal procedure, the prosecutor has to give reasons for his refusal to prose-
cute:
In the absence of grounds for initiating a criminal case, or if there exist circumstances
precluding proceedings in a case, a procurator. . . shall refuse to initiate the criminal
case.
A reasoned decree of refusal to initiate a criminal case shall be rendered and...
[interested parties] shall be notified thereof, and the right to appeal from such decree
shall be explained to them.
A refusal to initiate a criminal case may be appealed. . . to the proper procurator or
higher court, as appropriate.
Code, supra note 12, Art. 113 at 237.
76. Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), is illustrative. Pugach petitioned
the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the U.S. Attorney to prosecute New
York police and D.A. officers for alleged violations of wiretap regulations. He claimed that
the police and a District Attorney had wiretapped his telephone conversations and divulged
their contents to newspapers and to the county grand jury, causing his arrest and indictment.
The court ordered the U.S. Attorney to show cause why a writ should not be granted. In
dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the court stated:
Even if by some stretch of the imagination. . . [power to grant the writ existed], the
Court would still be compelled to deny it. . . . [I]t is not the business of the courts to
tell the United States Attorney to perform what they conceive to be his duties ....
The federal courts are powerless to interfere with his discretionary power. The Court
cannot compel him to prosecute a complaint, or even an indictment, whatever his rea-
sonsfor not acting.
Id at 634-35 (emphasis added).
77. See note 74 supra.
78. See United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 102 (S.D. 111. 1945). See also note 17
supra.
79. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 2 Mass. 172 (1806); Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37
Mass. 356 (1838); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1868); Gray v. District Court, 42
Colo. 298, 94 P. 287 (1908) (per curiam) (en banc); State v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235, 258 S.W.2d
590 (1953) (en banc). See also United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill. 1945);
United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262 (D. Mont. 1924).
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B. The Charge
It is also within the prosecutor's discretion to shape formal charges-
the nature and number of crimes to be prosecuted against a particular
suspect. In many cases, the prosecutor's decision is largely a matter of
tactics, and the formal charges may appear to be unrelated, or related
indirectly, to the alleged criminal acts. Prosecutors in the United States
are often involved in what is usually referred to as "overcharging" or
"charging up." This means that a prosecutor, either adhering to a con-
templated pattern of "effective" law enforcement, or firmly intending to
convict a given defendant, squeezes all possible charges out of the evi-
dence at hand. In "overcharging," the prosecutor not only charges
those necessarily included offenses, but also those violations of law that
are lesser included offenses. A prosecutor in a small city in Ohio, obvi-
ously reacting to community concerns about crime, explained to this
author that, in order to prevent crime in the area and deal effectively
with criminals, his office pursued the policy of charging on as many
counts and separate crimes as the evidence could sustain, as well as on
the highest type of crime that could be sustained by the evidence.
8 0
As implied in these explanations, and as generally understood, prac-
tices such as "overcharging" make conviction through trial more likely.
This is because the prosecutor will have something left to back up the
prosecution, and the defendant can still be convicted on one or more of
the several counts if a portion of the evidence is excluded at trial.
"Overcharging" is also an indispensable instrument for the prosecutor's
moves to induce a guilty plea and plea negotiations. The more he is
charged, the more willing a defendant will be to plead guilty. It is not
then surprising that prosecutors deliberately "charge up" in order to
gain a bargaining advantage.8 '
One species of "overcharging" is successive prosecutions, when
charges are successively brought, in separate trials, against the same
defendant for separate offenses arising out of the same criminal epi-
sode. Successive prosecutions can become dramatic. When they occur,
they seem to be motivated by vengeful instincts to chastise rather than
by an interest to ensure that justice is done.
82
80. Interview with Mr. Richard E. Bridwell, Prosecuting Attorney of Muskingum County,
Zanesville, Ohio, Apr. 6, 1977. Mr. Bridwell, however, pointed out he did not feel the term
"overcharging" was appropriate in light of his office's charging policy.
81. See WEINREB, supra note 22, at 58.
82. See, e.g., Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (per curiam). The defendant's wife
and three children were found dead in a burning building with bullet wounds in their heads.
First, the defendant was prosecuted and tried for the murder of his wife. The penalty was
fixed at twenty years' imprisonment. Afterward, he was tried for the murder of one of the
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"Charging down," as opposed to "overcharging," is the result of plea
bargaining. The natural outcome of "overcharging," "charging down"
is also within the prosecutor's discretion. As plea bargaining is largely
the prosecutor's enterprise, he is free to exercise his discretion in decid-
ing whether to offer concessions. Examples are striking. In Newman v.
United States,83 appellant and co-defendant were indicted for house-
breaking and petty larceny. The prosecutor consented to a guilty plea
to a misdemeanor for appellant's co-defendant but refused the same for
appellant. Appellant asserted that he and his co-defendant were
equally guilty. The court once again reaffirmed the judiciary's stance
of non-interference with the prosecutor's discretionary control of crimi-
nal prosecutions.84
Despite his general interest in guilty pleas, the prosecutor does not
necessarily consent to any plea by any defendant. As it happens, some
defendants, willing to plead guilty in exchange for charge and sentence
concessions, may confront the wall of the prosecutor's disinclination.
As James Ahern suggests, "[w]hat is not excusable. . . is the discrimi-
natory way in which plea-bargaining operates. Because of public pres-
sures for 'law and order,' prosecutors must gain maximum penalties for
children and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. He was prosecuted for the third
time for the murder of the second child, and at this time he was sentenced to death. At each
of the trials, the prosecutor introduced into evidence materials relating to a single episode of
all the deaths. The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor did not deny due process to the
defendant by subjecting him to three separate prosecutions for the same episode. Id at 573.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas commented: "This case presents an instance of
the prosecution being allowed to harass the accused with repeated trials and convictions on
the same evidence, until it achieves its desired result of a capital verdict." 1d. (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). In fact, the defendant was "duly processed to death."
It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit has held that an attempt by the prosecution to seek
a heavier sentence for offenses arising out of the same act upon retrial of a defendant is
generally "inherently suspect." United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 939 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976). However, in Preciado-Gomez, the court did not
object to the addition of two counts in the re-indictment after mistrial. The court held that
the defendant had been charged with new, separate and different offenses occurring on dif-
ferent dates, although the charges all related to his illegal entry into the United States. Id at
939-40.
83. 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
84. Id at 481-82. The court noted:
To say that the United States Attorney must literally treat every offense and every
offender alike is to delegate him an impossible task; of course, this concept would ne-
gate discretion. Myriad factors can enter into the prosecutor's decision. Two persons
may have committed what is precisely the same legal offense but the prosecutor is not
compelled by law, duty or tradition to treat them the same as to charges. On the con-
trary, he is expected to exercise discretion and common sense to the end that if, for
example, one is a young first offender and the other older, with a criminal record, or one
played a lesser and the other a dominant role, one the instigator and the other a fol-
lower, the prosecutor can and should take such factors into account; no court has any
jurisdiction to inquire or review his decision.
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some serious offenders. These maximum sentences are virtually always
given to the poor and to those without influence who cannot afford
good lawyers."8 5 On the other hand, the prosecution may be very
quick to offer bargains when the interests of the prosecution or political
interests are at stake.86 Arranged by the prosecutor and shaped by his
discretion, the guilty plea means that, in most of the criminal cases in
the United States, two basic questions, that of guilt and that of its pun-
ishment, are, in effect, resolved through the prisms of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. The question of guilt is directly related to the question of truth
in the criminal process. Yet a bargained guilty plea may cause a de-
fendant to confess to a crime that he never committed, or could not
possibly have committed in view of the circumstances.87 Or his guilt
may be far greater than his plea. The truth and facts are irrelevant in
this system of bargained "justice." When pleas are arranged by
prosecutorial discretion, the truth is sacrificed for administrative effi-
ciency, the need for a quick disposition of the case, a desire for an im-
pressive record of convictions, and other self-serving interests having
nothing to do with the interests and goals of justice. Furthermore, the
85. J. AHERN, POLICE IN TROUBLE 103 (1972).
86. At the highest level of politics, two guilty pleas (technically, both were nolo con-
tendere) have become causes cY'kbres in recent years: one by Spiro Agnew, former Vice-
President, and another by Richard Helms, ex-CIA chief.
Agnew, reportedly involved in corruption while Governor of Maryland, was charged
merely with tax evasion. Mr. Elliot Richardson, then the Attorney General, in recom-
mending the plea, explained the prosecution's approach: "It is unthinkable that this nation
should have been required to endure the anguish and uncertainty of a prolonged period in
which the man next in line of succession to the Presidency was fighting the charges brought
against him by his own Government." Kress, The.Agnew Case.- Policy, Prosecution andPlea
Bargaining, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 80, 84 (1974) (quoting Elliot Richardson, N.Y. Times, Oct.
11, 1973). Agnew's plea thus allowed the Government to save face in a twofold manner by
demonstrating its committment to prosecute yet barring the trial of "the man next to the
President." See also Newman, The Agnew Plea Bargain, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 85 (1974).
Helms could have been prosecuted on two felony counts of perjury. He had lied before
the Senate about the CIA's covert activities in Chile. Helms' lawyer made an explicit threat
that, if the ex-CIA chief went to trial on felony charges, government secrets would necessar-
ily be divulged. The Justice Department reacted promptly and offered to Helms the plea of
nolo contendere on some misdemeanor charges. Senator Church commented: "I thought
there was to be an end to the double standard of justice for big shots. Apparently, Helms
was just too hot to handle." Helms Makes a Deal, TIME, Nov. 14, 1977, at 23.
87. Some situations are ridiculous. The following is illustrative. A person is prosecuted
on a speeding charge in a jurisdiction in which a conviction of that charge results in a loss of
driving license for a period of time. There are doubts that the prosecution can prove the
speeding charge, so the prosecutor offers to reduce the charge to the minor offense of cross-
ing a white line, subject to a small fine. The charge is appropriately reduced, and the plea
accepted, even though on the street in question there is no white line. Chambliss & Seid-
man, Prosecution: Law, Order, and Power, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 235, 245-46
(R. Quinney ed. 1974).
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discretionary choice of a charge through bargained pleas outlines the
sentence and dominates the judicial sentencing function.
C. Juveniles
Prosecutorial discretion is present in every procedure within the
criminal process. It is found even when it should not be found at all.
For instance, the author was amazed to discover that the most vulner-
able group of accused, the youth, is exposed to prosecutorial discretion
instead of being safely protected against it.88
In American criminal justice, delinquent youths of the same age can
be treated as juveniles or as adults. Those treated as juveniles enjoy
certain rights and benefits,89 which those treated as adults do not enjoy.
Thus, assignment to either group is of vital importance to an accused
youth. Yet the law provides that prosecutors may decide administra-
tively to which category a youthful offender belongs. Both the federal9"
and the District of Columbia9 statutes allow the prosecution to deter-
mine the "procedural age" of such an offender. The prosecutor's deter-uination depends on the initial charge and precludes a court hearing.
In 1973, the Fourth Circuit held that, under federal law, the decision to
prosecute an offender as an adult is a matter of prosecutorial discretion
88. See generally Note, Youthful Offenders and Adult Courts: Prosecutorial Discretion vs
Juvenile Rights, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1184 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Youthful Offenders].
89. See id at 1184.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency shall not be
proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General, after
investigation, certifies to an appropriate district court of the United States that the juve-
nile court or other appropriate court of a State (1) does not have jurisdiction or refuses
to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile
delinquency, or (2) does not have available programs and services adequate for the
needs of juveniles.
Id (emphasis added).
91. The code of the District of Columbia provides:
(3) The term "child" means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except that
the term "child" does not include an individual who is sixteen years of age or older
and-
(A) charged by the United States attorney with (i) murder, forcible rape, burglary
in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with intent to commit any such
offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense properly joinable with
such an offense;
(B) charged with an offense referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) and convicted by
plea or verdict of a lesser included offense; or
(C) charged with a traffic offense.
For purposes of this subchapter the term "child" also includes a person under the age of
twenty-one who is charged with an offense referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) or (C)
committed before he attained the age of sixteen, or a delinquent act committed before
he attained the age of eighteen.
D.C. CODE § 16-2301(3) (1973).
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and that the Attorney General's determination regarding the youth's
status is uncontrolled.92 Thus, the discretion of the federal prosecutor
in the United States dictates which of the accused youths will be enti-
tled to additional procedural guarantees.
D. Pros and Cons of Discretion
There seem to be three basic reasons why discretionary powers of the
prosecutor still exist in this country, are immune to criticism, and can
effectively resist attempts at reform. The first reason is of an adminis-
trative nature. The traditional organization of prosecution services in
the United States is based upon decentralization, the autonomy of sep-
arate prosecutors' offices, and the lack of visible cooperation and coor-
dination among them. In most states, local prosecutors are elected
officials subject to no administrative control from above. 93 They would
never admit or accept being controlled from within except by intangi-
ble forms of "community pressures." The attorney general of a state is
rarely an administrative head of prosecution services in the state and
has no supervisory powers over local prosecutors. Also an elected offi-
cial, he can assert an independent position within the state's govern-
ment and follow policies different from those of the Governor.94
92. Cox v. United States" 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869
(1973). The same pattern was followed in United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir.
1972). For an analysis of the decisions and statutes involved, see Youthful Offenders, supra
note 88.
93. In the Soviet Union, in order to ensure uniform application of the laws, prosecution
services are provided on a centralized basis. "Agencies of the procuracy in the USSR shall
constitute a single centralized system headed by the Procurator General of the USSR with
subordination of inferior procurators to superiors." Statute, supra note 23, Art. 5 at 184.
"[A]gencies of the procuracy shall exercise their functions independently of any local agen-
cies whatsoever, being subordinate only to the Procurator General of the USSR." Id Art. 6
at 184.
Professor Davis asserts that "possibly the most important check of discretionary action is
simply the normal supervision of subordinates by superiors." DAVIS, supra note 6, at 143.
94. Mr. Robert Morgan, Attorney General of North Carolina, has stated:
As a state Attorney General, I have served with a Governor of my own political faith
and with a Governor of the other party. In neither case have I viewed my job as part of
the Governor's staff. This is my concept of the Attorney General-to serve as the state's
chief law officer, giving his allegiance to the law, not to political leaders or power
groups.
Statement of Robert Morgan, Attorney General of North Carolina, in Hearings, supra note
68, at 324.
To back their administrative independence, both the Attorney General and local district
attorneys employ different concepts-allegiance to the law, public servants, people's repre-
sentation, parens patriae roles, sovereign's law officer. With all, due to the honest belief of
some prosecutors in their civic responsibilities, they serve as attorneys for the government
first and foremost.
The naive may believe that because the people pay the salaries, through taxes, of gov-
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In the federal government, the structure of prosecution services ap-
pears on its face to be centralized and hierarchical: the United States
Attorney General is statutorily authorized to supervise and direct the
United States Attorneys who act as his representatives in federal judi-
cial districts.95 Despite this explicit statutory command, representatives
of the United States Attorney General run their offices in an independ-
ent manner, and, in discharge of their prosecution function, may act
irrespective of the wishes of their superiors.96 The prosecutor's discre-
tionary control over cases is the traditional justification for the substan-
tial independence of United States Attorneys.97
The second reason for the immunity of prosecutorial discretion is of
a legal nature. Throughout American history, the courts have pre-
sumed that prosecutorial discretion is an inherent aspect of the com-
mon law status of the prosecutor. In theory, as a party to an adversary
contest, an attorney prosecuting on behalf of his client is vested with
the power to handle freely the criminal suit brought by him. The Eng-
lish common law doctrine of prosecutorial discretion was brought to
the United States and developed here by the courts. As the authorities
suggest, however, American courts developed the doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion in a different direction, and it has far out-
reached its English predecessor.98 Whether prosecutorial discretion is
emnment lawyers, then they-the people-should be their client. Not so: The "Govern-
ment" is the client of the government lawyer . . . and it is not always true that the
interests of the government and of the people (however defined) coincide.
Miller, Justice Without Politics, PROGRESSIVE, April 1974, reprinted in Hearings, supra note
68, at 379.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1976).
96. See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173-74 (1954); United States v. Smyth,
104 F. Supp. 283, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
97. See Special Prosecutor, supra note 69, at 586-92. Interaction between the U.S. Attor-
neys and the Department of Justice also depends upon informal patterns of operations be-
hind a statutorily provided framework. Some of the U.S. Attorneys willingly submit to the
leadership of the Department; others resist what they may consider to be encroachments by
Washington on their prerogatives and autonomy. See J. EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND THE
LEGAL PROCESS 160-65 (1973).
Persistence in this totally independent policy may have dramatic consequences for a U.S.
Attorney, for the Attorney General is not without legal remedies to enforce his will. "Devia-
tions from [the U.S. Attorney's] duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his
superiors. . . . The President has abundent supervisory and disciplinary powers-including
summary dismissal-to deal with misconduct of his subordinates .... " Newman v.
United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
This power was recently used, for instance, against Mr. David Marston, U.S. Attorney in
Philadelphia. In 1978, he was abruptly removed from office in the midst of his investigation
into alleged corruption among Democratic politicians.
98. SpecialProsecutor, supra note 69, at 604. For a general discussion of the common law
roots of prosecutorial discretion, see id at 602-07.
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"the product of unplanned evolution 9 9 or "power resulting from de-
fault," 00 it is firmly rooted in the administration of American criminal
justice. It is a premise drawn from centuries of common law and insti-
tutionalized through lines of court decisions.' Prosecutorial discre-
tion has been declared by courts to be an "inherent" feature that
"arise[s] out of the very nature of the office" of the prosecutor, 0 2 sub-
ject to no outer controls.
10 3
Theoretically, there are several remedies that can be used by courts
or by higher officials to curb the discretion of prosecutors. These may
be direct or indirect, formal or informal,0 4 but they are rarely invoked,
except in those "extreme" situations when a prosecutor oversteps those
broad lines defining his right of unabridged discretion. Outside this
broad area, there are only cases of outright misuse and abuse of power
and apparent corruption. Illegitimate motives behind the actions of a
prosecutor in those areas between institutionalized "lawful" discretion
and discretion that has become arbitrary are difficult to prove. Prose-
cutors accused of abuses of power in administrative or court proceed-
ings brought against them usually have sufficient arguments to show
the validity and necessity of their discretion in handling criminal cases.
Courts hearing appeals by prosecutors who have been subjected to ad-
ministrative or judicial remedies of control follow the reasoning of
those appellants. As a rule, the courts declare the judiciary to be in-
competent to intrude into the exercise of discretionary powers by prose-
cutors, because "such intrusion is contrary to the settled judicial
tradition."0 5 Existing remedies to control prosecutorial discretion turn
out to be ineffective.
Political interest appears to be the third factor why broad
prosecutorial discretion is being preserved practically untouched in the
American legal system. Flexible use of prosecutorial discretion can be
an effective instrument of politics. At the local level, the policy of the
99. DAvis, supra note 6, at 189.
100. Vorenberg, supra note 69, at 680.
101. See, e.g., cases cited at note 79 supra.
102. See State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 164, 96 A.2d 63, 69 (1953) (quoting State v. Weleck,
10 N.J. 355, 366, 91 A.2d 751, 756 (1952)).
103. One federal court has stated that "[prosecutorial] discretion . . . is not to be con-
trolled by the courts, or by an interested individual, or by a group of interested individuals."
United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. Ill. 1945).
104. The statutes provide for different forms of remedies-disbarment, prosecution for
power abuses, ouster or quo warranto suits, mandamus proceedings, intervention by the
Attorney General, and others. For a detailed discussion, see MILLER, supra note 5, at 293-
345.
105. Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Neb. 1949).
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prosecutor is often affected, or, perhaps directly controlIed, by local
political machines and political and business leaders, who give their
political and/or financial support to his election campaign. The prose-
cutor may shape the policy of his office in such a way that it fits the
interests of those who backed him in his career. The prosecutor, as a
member of a political party, may enforce the policy of his party by
choosing a certain course of prosecutions, or by associating his suc-
cesses with his party's strategies. Discretion becomes an indispensable
instrument in implementing those policies, and it is used to promote a
certain microclimate in the jurisdiction.'
Discretionary power to enforce certain laws, while refusing to en-
force others, may be used at a higher level of government by the United
States Attorney General and the subordinate army of federal prosecu-
tors and investigators. Thus, prosecutorial discretion can be used to
implement government policies affecting the entire country. The lives
of many Americans, as well as the state of the politico-legal regime in
the country, depend upon the directions of the use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion at the federal level.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy often referred to the "lack of fed-
eral power" to intervene in the South where acts of violence by white
racists occurred without prosecution. When three civil rights activists
were murdered in Mississippi in 1964, he claimed that the incident was
a matter for local law enforcement. 0 7 When asked by civil rights orga-
nizations to prosecute racists upon an information rather than upon
indictments by grand juries, which were packed in the South by segre-
gationists, the Department of Justice, declined the requests. In many
cases, it claimed a lack of legal authority to carry out the requests. But,
a few months later, the Department was able to do precisely what had
been sought, namely, prosecuting on an information, thus avoiding
Southern segregationist grand juries. 8
Prosecutorial discretion can cause shifts in policies with a change of
administrations. For example, Democratic Attorney General Ramsey
106. Robert Meyer, appointed in 1970 as the U.S. Attorney for Los Angeles, was known
to be a "hard liner," a characteristic which the police deemed favorable to them. But, to the
surprise of the police, Mr. Meyer launched a series of investigations into police shootings
that had resulted in the killing of persons of minority groups. The police were furious to see
a "hard liner" "hard lining" the police. Police Chief Davis explained Meyer's zeal as being
part of the "Western strategy" of the Republican party to increase the number of votes for
the Republicans among minority groups in the Los Angeles area. NEWSWEEK, March 15,
1971, at 37.
107. V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 170 (1971).
108. Id at 171.
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Clark was opposed to extensive use of electronic surveillance' 0 9 and
threatened to refuse to enforce Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act.1"0 His successor in the Republican Administration, John Mitchell,
on the contrary, was an ardent advocate of unrestricted wiretapping
and made Title III one of the most favored instruments of his "law and
order" policy."',
Prosecutorial discretion can also help shape long-term strategic pol-
icy of the government in law enforcement, making it flexible whenever
so required by the political interests of the ruling elite. Ebbs and flows
in the prosecution of political activists and radicals are due to the dis-
cretion of government prosecutors. In prosecuting activists, the govern-
ment, through its prosecutors, may not necessarily insist on the use of
the harshest criminal sanctions. What should be viewed as more im-
portant is the indication of a willingness to use them. In initiating the
prosecution of a political activist for technical violation of some crimi-
nal statute, the prosecution may be pursuing not the conviction per se,
but the moral condemnation of "an offender." Prosecutorial discretion
allows the bringing of charges, calling of the grand jury, pressuring of
witnesses for information, arranging of "leaks" to the mass media, and,
finally, dismissal of the case. Procedurally, a person is discharged, but
politically, he is not, because the government has demonstrated its neg-
ative attitude toward him and branded him "a criminal.""I2 As Harvey
Silverglate states:
[T]he government is not interested only, or perhaps even primarily, in
winning cases and in putting dissidents behind bars.... The point had
been made-the government would follow, investigate, film, photograph,
and prosecute selected enemies of the Republic who would serve as warn-
ings and examples to others.
Furthermore, the government has weapons other than political trials,
perhaps more potent weapons. The government can take steps to en-
courage lower echelon "law enforcement" officials and to signal an end to
high level condemnation of uncivilized police tactics."
3
109. This did not prevent the FBI's wiretaps of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., however.
110. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat.
213 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (3)(1976)).
111. For a general discussion of Justice Department policies under Democrats and
Republicans in the 1960's, see J. ELLIFF, CRIME, DISSENT, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
(1971).
112. Philistine common sense presumes the guilt of a person once pulled into the criminal
justice machinery. Prosecutors "leaking" information to the media feed that presumption
and accuse a person politically, for he will remain a "suspect" regardless of the subsequent
dismissal of the case.
113. Silverglate, The 1970"r: .4 Decade of Repression?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA
127, 138-39 (R. Quinney ed. 1974).
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The advocates of broad discretionary powers for prosecutors are
those political groups in power. They view this discretion as an effec-
tive instrument to be used with flexibility. These groups use all of their
authority and influence to retain the status quo with respect to broad
prosecutorial discretion. The results of their activities can be seen, for
example, in the fact that the attempts to reorganize the Department of
Justice and to limit the Attorney General's powers have failed. They
can also be seen in the fact that there are no significant cases in which
courts have substantially curbed prosecutorial discretion. 1 4 This is
happening "in an era when the judiciary has otherwise assumed an ac-
tive role in imposing limitations upon the exercise of discretion by the
executive branch."'"15
Many advocates of prosecutorial discretion view "sound" discretion
as an integral and necessary element of the application of criminal law.
Justice Breitel's oft-quoted notion is illustrative: "If every policeman,
every prosecutor, every court, and every post-sentence agency per-
formed his or its responsibility in strict accordance with rules of law,
precisely and narrowly laid down, the criminal law would be ordered
but intolerable."
'" 6
Discretion is considered "a tool, indispensable for individualization
of justice," and "[r]ules alone, untempered by discretion, cannot cope
with the complexities of modern government and of modern justice.""17
Discretion is also a practical necessity in those situations in which crim-
inal law is chaotic, such as mutually contravening provisions, vague
definitions, and outlived taboos." 8 Enforcement of the criminal law
inevitably invites discretion. In view of the constant crime growth and
the correspondingly huge case loads, discretion is the only way to keep
prosecutors' offices operating. The prosecution of all crimes would clog
the criminal justice mechanism with a flood of cases.
Proponents of prosecutorial discretion point to positive aspects of the
prosecutor's right to enforce or not to enforce laws, such as the non-
prosecution of violations of archaic or "unpopular" statutes. Both the
114. In cases of obvious abuse of discretion, however, courts may set aside a prosecution
on the basis of discrimination "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
The Ninth Circuit has set aside a prosecution brought to intimidate "the vocal offender" for
the "expression of ideas." United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972).
115. Special Prosecutor, supra note 69, at 587.
116. Breitel, supra note 69, at 427.
117. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 25.
118. "Indeed, one of the major consequences of the state of penal law today is that ad-
ministration has so largely come to dominate the field. . . ." Wechsler, The Challenge ofa
ModelPenal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1952).
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consequence and the indicator of the state of the criminal law,
prosecutorial discretion serves to assess and select practically enforce-
able laws, thus outlining directions for legislative reforms. Consistent
refusal to enforce certain statutes or to bring maximum charges can
lead to decriminalization of offenses punishable under those statutes.
Prosecutorial discretion can also be used to avoid harsh sentences for
defendants. In view of the fact that the United States has some of the
harshest sentences, using discretion for leniency can contribute to jus-
tice. The positive aspects of prosecutorial discretion advanced by its
proponents, however, cannot outweigh the potential and actual harm
inflicted on justice by its uncontrolled and broad use. "[E]very truth
extolling discretion may be matched by a truth about its dangers." '19
E Selective Prosecution
Unlimited discretion inevitably introduces subjectivism and arbitrar-
iness into the prosecutorial process and leads to the selective enforce-
ment of laws. For example, a prosecutor in one jurisdiction may
enforce a certain category of law, while his colleague in another juris-
diction enforces that same category vigorously. In a third jurisdiction,
such a category is enforced by spontaneous campaigns, and in still an-
other jurisdiction, a prosecutor does not prosecute violators of this law
at all. In the United States, then, we can see a situation that seems to
contradict a common principle of equal justice, namely, the equality of
citizens before the law and an even-handed application of the law.
This practice of selective enforcement has a negative impact on the pre-
vention and reduction of crime, because it creates a favorable climate
for the growth of crime in jurisdictions in which certain types of crimes
are not prosecuted, as well as an opportunity for crime to flow from one
area to another. How can there be effective crime control in a particu-
lar county when, in a neighboring county, crime is controlled loosely?
A community's freedom from crime is thus unsecured. Selective en-
forcement, then, coupled with the superfluous responsiveness to com-
munity sentiments,1 20 encourages the development and consolidation
of localist approaches in the prosecutors' operations and erects obsta-
cles to a uniform application of the law.'
2 1
119. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 25.
120. The 1967 President's Commission observed that "[p]olitical considerations make
some prosecutors overly sensitive to what is safe, expedient, and in conformity with law
enforcement views that are popular rather than enlightened." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 54, at 73.
121. Uniform application of the law is a great social value and, at the same time, the way
to ensure justice. Despite certain positive aspects of localist law enforcement, e.g., respon-
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Selective enforcement also means vigorous prosecution of some per-
sons and non-enforcement with respect to others. Selective enforce-
ment usually focuses on "unpopular" individuals. Attorney General
Jackson once commented:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can
choose his defendants. . . .[A] prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding
at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost any-
one. . . It is in this realm-in which the prosecutor picks some person
whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpop-
ular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of
abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes
personal.1
22
Although courts reverse cases in which the prosecution has been obvi-
ously discriminatory, the suspicion remains that selective enforcement,
with thoroughly hidden motives, is used by prosecutors against politi-
siveness to community needs, such discretion hides many more dangers. This author views
such localism as being in contradiction to the ideals behind the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution.
It is noteworthy that the Soviet Procuracy was conceived as the institution specially orga-
nized to see that the laws would be uniformly and adequately applied throughout the newly
born Soviet Republic. In 1922, when the legislative body was discussing proposals to estab-
lish the Procuracy, the majority of the legislative committee, which was elected to work on
the statute, was inclined to incorporate the principle of "dual" subordination into the struc-
ture of procuratorial agencies. This meant that a local procurator would be subordinate to
the superior procurator on one hand and to the local municipal government on the other
hand. The leader of the Revolution and the founder of the Socialist State in Russia, Vladi-
mir Lenin, strongly opposed the idea of "dual" subordination. In his letter to the
Politbureau (the highest executive body of the Communist Party) of May 20, 1922, Lenin
wrote:
I learned of the arguments only in this respect, that the advocacy of "dual" subordina-
tion was the legitimate fight against bureaucratic centralism, for the requisite indepen-
dence of provinces and against the arrogant attitude of the central government to local
municipal functionaries. Is there any arrogance in the viewpoint that legality cannot be
one for Kaluga and another for Kazan, but should be All-Russian, single, whole and
even for all the federation of Soviet Republics?. . .The procurator has the right and is
obliged to do one thing: to see that a truly uniform concept of legality is established
across the Republic, regardless any local distinctions and despite any local pres-
sures. . . .Local pressure is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antagonist of the
establishment of legality ....
45 V. LENIN, 0 "Dyolnom" Podchinenii i Zakonnosti, POLN. SOBR. SOTCH. 197-98 (On
"Dual" Subordination and Legality) (translated from the Russian by the author).
Lenin's ideas were incorporated into the law. The Statute on Procuracy Supervision
reads, in part: "The Procurator General of the U.S.S.R. and procurators subordinate to him
shall be obliged to watch over proper and uniform application of the laws of the U.S.S.R.
and of the union and autonomous republics, notwithstanding any local differences and de-
spite any local influences." Statute, supra note 23, Art. 2 at 183.
122. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 AMER. JUD. Soc'Y 18, 19 (1940), quoted in DA-
vis, supra note 6, at 190.
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cally or otherwise "unpopular" persons.'23
F Constitutional Shortfall
The broad discretion exercised by the prosecutor while deciding the
major issues in criminal procedure does not further the achievement of
the goals of justice and does not secure defendants' procedural rights,
because the assumed purposes of many institutions are distorted in
favor of, and in the interests of, the prosecution. Although theoretically
under the control of judicial officials, but virtually on his judgment
alone, the prosecutor directs the flow of proceedings toward trial and,
in the interests of the whole criminal justice system, does his best to
prevent the trial. "[T]he survival of adversary trials in present condi-
tions depends on there not being too many of them. [Prosecutors] can
offer a trial to all only if few accept the offer."' 24 In ninety percent of
all criminal cases, convictions result not from trials but from guilty
pleas based mainly on bargaining. Again, the terms of these bargained
pleas are worked out in the prosecutor's office, subject to his discretion.
Yet plea bargaining serves neither the primary, "practical" goals of
criminal justice-prosecution of crime, rehabilitation, deterrence, or
retribution' 2 5-nor the general constitutional values upon which crimi-
nal justice should function.
126
American law and legal doctrines declare that democratic princi-
ples-the adversary system, the presumption of innocence, the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof, the jury trial, the determination of guilt in
public proceedings, and the observance of procedural guarantees
within constitutional "due process" requirements-are essential to
criminal justice. These are not abstract values; they are universal ideals
123. In 1963, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that a criminal prosecution violated the
constitutional rights of the defendant who had alleged that he had been "discriminatorily"
picked out because of suspected radical leanings. Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312
F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1962). The motives for selective prosecution must be established by a
defendant, which makes it especially difficult to sustain this type of defense. See, e.g.,
United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gardiner, 531
F.2d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
124. WEINREB, supra note 22, at 82.
125. Professor Vorenberg suggests that permitting the prosecutor to handle a case in his
discretion "obscures the fact that the system has reacted to the pressure of increasing num-
bers by sacrificing a basic value-punishment appropriate to the crime-in order to avoid
investing additional resources." Vorenberg, supra note 69, at 671. For a criticism of current
prosecutorial administration through the prism of the "practical" purposes of criminal jus-
tice, see WEINREB, supra note 22.
126. For an excellent analysis of plea bargaining from a constitutional viewpoint, see Plea
Bargaining, supra note 61.
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nourished by human strivings to ensure justice. 127 They are designed
to protect the individual's dignity and liberty against the encroachment
of the powerful and, at the same time, to ensure "domestic tranquility."
They are also the means to achieve the goals of justice in general and in
concrete cases. The legality of the procedure provides the legality of
the substance: the "validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely
depend on the mode by which it was reached."'
121
Within the ideal model of "due process," every defendant is pre-
sumed innocent until his guilt is proven in an adversary trial, at which
the openness of the proceedings and the presence of jury, counsel, and
judge protect him against the punitive zeal of the police and the prose-
cution. In reality, nothing of the kind happens. In ninety percent of all
cases, the trial, which is supposed to showcase the triumph of majestic
rights, is cut off by the guilty plea, which has been induced by the pros-
ecutor and shaped by his discretion. The presumption of guilt is substi-
tuted for the presumption of innocence. How the truth can be
established in a quick ritual of a judge's acceptance of this plea is ques-
tionable. Thus, in current American criminal administration,
prosecutorial discretion neutralizes the effects of democratic principles,
for they are lost in its actual operation.
129
IV. CONCLUSION
Broad powers vested in the prosecutor, together with an unchal-
lenged privilege to use them at his pleasure, is an American phenome-
non. Another characteristic of the American prosecutor that is very
important for a concrete understanding of his potential is the close con-
nection between the prosecutor and politics. Unlike European prosecu-
tors, who are usually career officials, American prosecutors are active
politicians. Whether elected or appointed, the American prosecutor
comes to his office through politics and, in many instances, subjects the
policy of his office to political considerations. "The key to understand-
ing the prosecutorial system is political. Elected district attorneys with
127. The universal nature of these values, however vaguely formulated in the Bill of
Rights, is affirmed by the Marxist viewpoint. For example, American communists state:
"Socialism here will extend democracy to its fullest, taking as its starting point the demo-
cratic traditions and institutions of the American people. We believe and advocate that...
a socialist society in our country will guarantee all the liberties defined in the Bill of Rights
.... " PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE U.S.A. 103 (1970).
128. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
129. See generally PRASSEL, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 124-30
(1975).
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extensive control over individual liberty create a dangerous formula. It
sometimes surfaces in personal vendettas, crusades for publicity, or im-
proper announcements concerning unproven guilt.'
' 30
Broad powers to control the criminal process, combined with uncon-
trolled discretion, create a formula dangerous to the ideals of justice,
destructive of constitutional values, and unworkable in reducing
crime.' The fact that these broad discretionary powers of the prose-
cutor are an integral part of the American system of criminal justice
and, by and large, predetermine the parameters and outcomes of the
system is a distinguishing mark of the state of American criminal jus-
tice today. 32 In this sphere of law, where personal freedom, dignity,
reputation, or even the life of an individual are in jeopardy, the indi-
vidual's rights can hardly remain protected as long as the right of the
state to use its powers within its free discretion dominates. Broad dis-
cretion inevitably opens the way to arbitrariness. In the words of Mr.
Justice Douglas, "absolute discretion . . . is more destructive of free-
dom than any of man's other inventions."'
' 33
Proposals to confine prosecutorial powers to "structured" or "nar-
rowed" limits remain unrealized. This is due not only to the fact that
such proposals are opposed by those who have a vested interest in re-
taining the status quo, but also to the fact that prosecutorial discretion
is truly an inherent feature of the American legal system. "The irra-
tional procedures that [Americans] employ are not irregularities of an
otherwise sound process; they constitute the process itself."' 34
A tangible limitation on prosecutorial discretion is possible only with
radical reform of the substantive criminal law, unification of procedu-
ral law, and discontinuation of the "hands off" judicial posture that is
applied to prosecutorial discretion. Meanwhile, prosecution-at-plea-
sure will predetermine the direction and outcome of the administration
of the American criminal justice system.
130. Id at 126-27.
131. Professor Vorenberg asserts that "broad discretion does not seem to have been help-
ful in reducing crime." Vorenberg, supra note 69, at 695.
132. Professor Weinreb's notion sounds bitter: "No one who took careful account of the
purposes for which we have a system of criminal justice at aln and the values we want to
protect would set up the process we actually have." WEINREB, supra note 22, at 144.
133. United States v. Wunderlich 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
134. WEINREB, supra note 22, at 4.
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